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Introduction
Our lives are filled with open windows. Plenty of these windows are
in our homes, schools, businesses, and other buildings, and they often
have blinds on them that we can open or close, depending on our
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comfort with what outsiders will get to see within the buildings. Not
all windows are on buildings. Some of them are in our pockets. Some of
them sit on our desks. Some of them sit in closed compartments of our
cars, ready to navigate us to a new destination. These windows are
electronic devices, and they can provide a myriad of information about
our lives. While we voluntarily provide information to these devices in
order for them to perform the functions we desire, consider the possibility of these devices seemingly acting on their own accord. Also
consider whether the contents of messages sent through e-mail or social
media to designated recipients are truly private. Imagining the startling
image of a government agent reviewing your most intimate messages to
your significant other provokes fear.
This Comment is designed to determine when, and what kinds, of
information should be reviewable by government agents through
individuals’ voluntary actions. In order to do this, Part I reviews a
recently decided case, ACLU v. Clapper,1 analyzing how the case would
be decided as a Fourth Amendment issue, had the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals decided the case on that basis. Part II outlines three
categories of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which will provide a
helpful background to readers new to Fourth Amendment issues.
Part III determines the outcome of Clapper using the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence reviewed in Part II. Part IV reviews proposals to counter the pervasiveness of mass surveillance in American
society, some of which come from the Supreme Court as well as
academia. I also propose a solution, further delineated in Part Five.
The Comment ends with a summary of the topics discussed and final
thoughts on the overall subject.
This Comment will show that the bulk collection of metadata from
telephone calls and other electronic communications are permissible
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution without a warrant. However, disclosing the contents of communications to
government agencies and operating devices without the consent of their
owner constitutes searches requiring a warrant.

I. Case Summary
This Comment will begin by summarizing its subject case, ACLU
v. Clapper.2 Doing so provides necessary background but also demonstrates Clapper’s relevance in the overarching issue of mass surveillance
in the United States. Clapper provides a springboard into difficult but
necessary discussions about the constitutionality of domestic surveillance programs. The Second Circuit’s decision in Clapper also provided
1.

785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).

2.

785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
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momentum for Congress to craft a legislative remedy for the federal
government’s metadata collection from telecommunications companies’
phone records, a remedy which will be discussed further below as one
possible non-judicial solution to mass surveillance, should society deem
privacy and civil liberties to be a greater interest than security.3
A. Facts

Clapper decided whether the government may require telecommunications companies to transfer telephone metadata in bulk.4 This begs
the question, what is metadata? Defining what it is not provides a sigh
of relief to many libertarians, for metadata does not include the voice
content of telephone conversations. It does include other pertinent
information, such as a call’s length, the phone number the call came
from, and the phone number dialed.5 Occasionally, metadata reveals
the identity of callers and the devices they use, through identity numbers related to phone equipment.6 In other instances, how a call is
routed through the telecommunications network may reveal a caller’s
general location, but when metadata provides this information, locational data is far less precise than that detected by cell sites.7 Despite
metadata’s inability to replicate the most intimate information about a
phone call—the contents of the conversation—it still may reveal a great
deal of otherwise hidden information, such as intimate relationships,
religious beliefs, perhaps even a person’s mental health (all by identifying the individuals associated with phone numbers dialed, and the
source of those numbers).8
Judge Gerald E. Lynch, writing the Clapper majority opinion for
the Second Circuit, acknowledged similarities between information
gathered from telephone metadata and more traditional sources, like
the addresses on an envelope. But he distinguished telephone metadata
from traditional identifying information by emphasizing the “vast new
technological capability for large-scale and automated review and
analysis.”9 Though Judge Lynch does not state this outright, he is likely
referring to intelligence services pooling vast quantities of metadata and
then searching the metadata for individuals the intelligence community
is interested in. Metadata is valuable for this task since, in a world
closely connected by mobile phones, it is “virtually impossible” for
3.

See infra text accompanying note 38.

4.

Clapper, 785 F.3d at 793.

5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 794.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.
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individuals to avoid generating metadata through their normal
routine.10 After reviewing the importance and pervasiveness of metadata, Judge Lynch transitions to the facts.
The federal government determined that it could gather metadata
on the basis of section 215 of the Patriot Act. This statute allows the
FBI Director or his designee to “make an application for an order
requiring the production of any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”11 A now-infamous Foreign Intelligence Surveill-ance
Court (FISC) order required Verizon Business Network Services, Inc.
to produce call records, on a daily basis, of all telephone calls made
through its systems or services where one or both ends of the call are
within the United States.12 What makes this order infamous is that it
was revealed to the world by ex-federal government contractor Edward
Snowden in an article published by the British newspaper The
Guardian.13 The federal government later acknowledged that the
Verizon order was a small part of a much larger program collecting bulk
telephone data launched in May 2006.14 This program began with an
order, couched under section 215 of the Patriot Act, to produce “tangible things” that the federal government construed to mean telephone
metadata.15
The Government explained the purpose of collecting bulk metadata: to fight terrorism.16 Phone numbers believed by the government
to be associated with a foreign terrorist, based on a “reasonable articulable suspicion,” were searched within a massive database containing
metadata to yield phone numbers in contact with the suspicious phone
number, called a “seed.”17 A search would follow of all numbers found
in the metadata to be in contact with the seed number, and searches of
“the contacts of contacts of contacts of the original ‘seed’” telephone

10.

Id.

11.

50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012); Clapper, 785 F.3d at 795.

12.

Clapper, 785 F.3d at 795–96.

13.

Id. at 795. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions
of Verizon customers daily, The Guardian (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recordsverizon-court-order [http://perma.cc/42WP-3WGB].

14.

Clapper, 785 F.3d at 796.

15.

Id.

16.

See id. at 797.

17.

Id.
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number occurred as well.18 Responding to public pressure, President
Barack Obama ordered the FISC to alter the telephone meta-data
program in January 2014.19
President Obama made two changes to the telephone metadata
program. First, he only allowed searches of the metadata of phone
numbers in contact with the seed, or first suspicious phone number,
thus prohibiting searches of the “contacts of contacts of contacts of the
original ‘seed’” number.20 Judge Lynch described this as limiting the
searches to “two, rather than three” hops.21 The second change to the
telephone metadata program required an FISC judge determine that
the National Security Agency (NSA) satisfied the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard before allowing a telephone number to be searched
within the telephone metadata pool.22
B. Procedural Posture

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), New York Civil
Liberties Union (NYCLU), as well as current and former Verizon
customers, sued the government officials administering the telephone
metadata program on both statutory and constitutional grounds.23 The
complaint, filed in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York on June 11, 2013, requested that the court “declare that
the telephone metadata program exceeds the authority granted by
§ 215, and also violates the First and Fourth Amendments to the
[United States] Constitution.”24 About two months later, the plaintiffs
asked for a preliminary injunction, which would halt the government’s
collection of metadata, quarantine the records already collected, and
prohibit use of the records to perform queries into the phone numbers
and other identifying information associated with the plaintiffs.25 The
government moved to dismiss the complaint on the same day.26 On
December 27, 2013, “the district court granted the government’s motion
to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,”
setting the stage for an appeal to the Second Circuit.27
18.

Id.

19.

See id. at 798.

20.

Id. 797–98.

21.

Id. at 798.

22.

Id.

23.

Id. at 799.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 799–800.

26.

Id. at 800.

27.

Id.

265

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows
C. Second Circuit’s Decision

Once Clapper arrived at the Second Circuit, some preliminary
matters were disposed of prior to the court reaching the merits of the
case. First, the Second Circuit held that the ACLU and fellow plaintiffappellants had standing to sue because the “government’s own orders
demonstrate that appellants’ call records are indeed among those collected as part of the telephone metadata program.”28 Appellants’ injury
was the initial collection of their telephone metadata through the
Verizon order, rather than a subsequent search of the data.29 The injury,
seizure of metadata, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment
because it prohibits illegal searches and seizures.30 After surviving a
standing challenge, the appellants still had one preliminary issue to
overcome before reaching the merits of their claims.
The Government next argued that Congress never intended to
allow targets of section 215 orders from seeking judicial review. In doing
so, the Government stated that statutes keeping the metadata program
secret indicated an implied Congressional intent to prevent judicial
review for those actually targeted by section 215, such as telecommunications companies.31 The Second Circuit disagreed. It stated that “clear
and convincing” or “fairly discernible” evidence must suggest Congress
intended to preclude judicial review, and no such evidence was found.32
The court further concluded that it found no unexpressed intention to
withdraw judicial rights granted in a generally applicable Administrative Procedure Act statute.33 Finally, the court proceeded to the merits.
The court, confronted with a statutory issue as well as constitutional issues, began by determining whether section 215 could be interpreted to allow bulk collection of metadata by the government. The
court stated “[t]he basic requirements for metadata collection under
§ 215, then, are simply that the records be relevant to an authorized
investigation (other than a threat assessment).”34 The problem with the
government’s methods of metadata collection, as argued by the appellants, was that it was not collecting evidence on a particular subject
(an authorized investigation), but rather creating a huge pool of records
that would later be relevant to a specific investigation.35 The court then
28.

Id. at 801.

29.

See id.

30.

U.S. Const. amend. IV; Clapper, 785 F.3d at 801.

31.

Clapper, 785 F.3d at 804.

32.

Id. at 805.

33.

Id. at 810.

34.

Id. at 811.

35.

See id.
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concluded “the text of § 215 cannot bear the weight the government
asks us to assign to it, and that it does not authorize the telephone
metadata program.”36 The Second Circuit thus held that the telephone
metadata program exceeded the power granted under section 215. The
court acknowledged the “weighty” constit-utional issues brought up by
the appellants regarding the telephone metadata program but did not
reach them, having already held that the program was not authorized
by section 215.37 Though Clapper struck down the telephone metadata
program, the Fourth Amendment issues it presents are too pertinent
not to analyze.
This Comment’s purpose is to analyze whether, under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the telephone metadata program would
be constitutional. Though this may seem like a moot exercise due to
Clapper’s holding, as well as the passage of the USA Freedom Act,
which restricts the NSA from collecting telephone metadata in bulk,38
the presence of other electronic surveillance programs still creates a
need to analyze relevant Fourth Amendment issues pertaining to the
telephone metadata program and other forms of mass surveillance.

II. Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
A. Fourth Amendment and Exclusionary Rule Refresher

The ability for government agencies to access metadata, electronic
communications, and conduct surveillance in general is governed by the
Fourth Amendment. It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.39

36.

Id. at 821.

37.

Id. at 824.

38.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 103,
129 Stat. 268, 272 (2015). This act restricts the production of tangible things
(including telephone records) to the use of a “specific selection term.” Id.
This is used to parse through metadata collected by third parties.
Individuals’ metadata is still collectible and searchable, but the search is
restricted. Erin Kelly, Senate approves USA Freedom Act, USA Today
(June 2, 2015, 9:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2015/06/02/patriot-act-usa-freedom-act-senate-vote/28345747/
[http://perma.cc/YWP3-CQLS].

39.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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Note that the Fourth Amendment does not contain a remedy for
unreasonable searches and seizures. When many people debate the
federal government’s ability to conduct mass surveillance, you may hear
a proponent of civil liberties implore the surveillance supporter to “[u]se
the Fourth Amendment!”40 If the surveillance supporter followed the
civil-liberty supporter’s instructions and read the text of the Fourth
Amendment word-for-word, the surveillance supporter might quip
“Who cares about whether what the government did was illegal? The
constitutional text does not actually penalize the government for illegal
searches.” What the civil liberties proponent should say is that the
government’s action is an illegal search, but that lacks the rhetorical
beauty of crushing an opponent under the awe-striking power of the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court, long after the original
thirteen states ratified the Bill of Rights, created a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations.
In Weeks v. United States,41 the Supreme Court ensured that there
would be an attention-grabbing consequence for illegal searches under
the Fourth Amendment by creating the exclusionary rule, which
excludes from trial any evidence obtained by violating the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of whether the evidence shows a criminal
defendant’s guilt.42 While Weeks was a dramatic change in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, its exclusionary rule was not applied to the
states until the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio43 in 1961. After
Mapp, evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation could
be excluded from criminal trials in either federal or state courts at the
defense counsel’s request.44 With the Fourth Amendment text stated
and the exclusionary rule reviewed, understanding the situations in
which the exclusionary rule is applied will reveal whether the records
produced through the telephone metadata program discussed in Clapper
would be admissible as evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial.
B. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

Many Supreme Court cases address the Fourth Amendment and
the exclusionary rule, so there are many cases which may help a federal
court decide the constitutionality of a telephone metadata program or
40.

Fox News Primetime Republican Presidential Debate (FOX News Channel
television broadcast Aug. 6, 2015) (Senator Rand Paul used this phrase
in the debate while discussing the NSA’s bulk collection of phone records).

41.

232 U.S. 383 (1914).

42.

Id. at 393. The exclusionary rule also excludes evidence obtained by
violating the Fifth Amendment. Id.

43.

367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp v. Ohio incorporated the exclusionary rule to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 655.

44.

Id.
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other broad surveillance strategy. A few groups of cases will organize a
complex web of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into rules which are
easier to apply to constitutional issues, like the telephone metadata
program in Clapper, which would have been analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment but for its ruling on statutory grounds.45 Subpart (1) will
outline when individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy (without focusing on information gathered by or through devices meant to
record or transmit communications), subpart (2) will delineate the
third-party doctrine, and subpart (3) will explain the property-based
approach to the Fourth Amendment.
1. The Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
a. Establishment of the Rule

Virtually all individuals expect privacy within their abodes and
property, yet privacy interests do not necessarily end at one’s property
line or when homeowners cross the threshold of their front doors and
expose themselves to public view. In Katz v. United States,46 the
Supreme Court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”47 Katz transmitted wagering information from Los Angeles to
Miami and Boston by using a telephone booth.48 Katz shut the telephone booth’s door behind him when making the call to keep eavesdroppers at bay but his efforts were futile: the FBI heard Katz’s end of
the conversations by bugging the telephone booth with an electronic
listening device.49 Bugging telephone lines was constitutional before the
Supreme Court decided Katz because surveillance without a physical
trespass and without the seizure of tangible objects was not considered
a search under the Fourth Amendment.50 The Supreme Court discredited this view in Katz.
Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion, stated that the FBI’s
actions were unconstitutional because “[o]ne who occupies [a phone
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll . . . is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will
not be broadcast to the world.”51 Despite Justice Stewart writing the
majority opinion, one of the most well-known rules of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence actually came from Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion in Katz. He created a twofold requirement that must be met
45.

See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015).

46.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

47.

Id. at 351.

48.

Id. at 348.

49.

See id. at 348, 352.

50.

Id. at 353.

51.

Id. at 352.
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before Fourth Amendment protection extends to potential evidence: (1)
“a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”
and (2) “the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”52
In Katz, the defendant shut the door behind him when making a
call in the phone booth, which reveals that he actually expected his
conversation would be private.53 As for a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court determined that society considered Katz’s expectation of
privacy in the contents of his telephone conversation in a closed phone
booth to be reasonable.54 Since the second prong of the legitimateexpectation-of-privacy test assesses whether society deems the defendant’s expectation of privacy reasonable, it is extremely malleable to a
changing world and judicial creativity. It is the second prong that the
ACLU relies on in Clapper,55 as they would want federal courts to rule
that society deems reasonable the expectation that the metadata generated by telephone calls is private and, therefore, protected by the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreason-able searches and
seizures.56 What is considered to be a legitimate expectation of privacy
varies widely, with the unique facts of each case driving the legal
conclusions.
b. When a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy Exists

Fourth Amendment issues exist in a variety of contexts, with
household waste being no exception. California v. Greenwood57 examined “whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search
and seizure of garbage” left on a curb for collection by a local garbage
company.58 In Greenwood, police noticed vehicles would stop “during
the late-night and early morning hours” for brief amounts of time at
Greenwood’s home.59 Without seeking a warrant, police requested that
the local trash collector pick up trash bags left on the curb in front of
Greenwood’s home and turn them over to the police.60 Inside the bags
were narcotics-related items, which convinced a judge to grant a
warrant request to search the home, which contained cocaine and

52.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

53.

See id. at 352. (majority opinion).

54.

See id.

55.

See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821–25 (2d Cir. 2015).

56.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

57.

486 U.S. 35 (1988).

58.

Id. at 37.

59.

Id.

60.

See id. at 37–38.
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hashish.61 Greenwood argued that the search violated an expect-ation
of privacy because the trash was in opaque plastic bags that would be
mingled with others’ trash and disposed of at the garbage dump, where
linking the drug materials to particular suspects would be a nearimpossible task.62
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice White wrote in the majority
opinion that “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”63
Because Greenwood’s garbage was exposed to innumerable third parties
beyond his home’s curtilage, the Supreme Court held that no Fourth
Amendment protection extended to the garbage.64 Concealing garbage
in opaque bags and placing them in a publically-accessible location
disavows Fourth Amendment protection, but hiding illegal substances
behind high fencing in your yard would prevent the substances from
being viewed by the general public. Fourth Amendment protection
presumably applies through the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test.
So it would seem.
Fencing protects against street-level surveillance but allows a huge
opening for sky-based surveillance. California v. Ciraolo65 decided
whether warrantless aerial observation from 1,000 feet of a fenced-in
area of a backyard’s curtilage violates the Fourth Amendment.66 After
receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in Ciraolo’s
backyard, the police found that a six-foot outer fence and ten-foot inner
fence around the yard obstructed their street-level view.67 Ever the
creative bunch, the police procured a private plane, flew above the
yard—in publically-navigable airspace—and photographed marijuana
plants growing in the yard.68 A judge issued a warrant, and officers
subsequently seized marijuana at Ciraolo’s home.69 No sane person
thinks they are at risk of surveillance from above by the state, so
Ciraolo’s case provided a chance for the Supreme Court to extend
Fourth Amendment protection to fenced-in backyards. Not so.

61.

Id. at 38.

62.

Id. at 39.

63.

Id. at 40.

64.

Id. at 40–41.

65.

476 U.S. 207 (1986).

66.

Id. at 209.

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 209–10.
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The Supreme Court equated aerial observation of a backyard to the
neighborhood prowler watching you through a knothole in a fence,
stating, “if there is an opening, the police may look.”70 Ciraolo countered that his yard was part of the curtilage of his home, preventing
warrantless aerial surveillance.71 Prior Supreme Court precedent defined
a home’s curtilage as “the area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.’”72 The Supreme Court accepted that Ciraolo’s fenced-in yard and
its crop were within the home’s curtilage.73 But despite occurring within
the curtilage of a home, the Supreme Court found the warrantless
observations did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
observations occurred in public airspace without physical intrusion.74
Since private and commercial flight in public airways is routine, Ciraolo
lacks a reasonable expectation that his marijuana plants would be
constitutionally protected from naked-eye observation from 1,000 feet.75
With even areas shrouded by a home’s curtilage subject to warrantless
surveillance, the police’s natural next step was to subject activities
within a home to warrantless surveillance from a public vantage point.
This opportunity came at the turn of the millennium.
The story of Kyllo v. United States76 starts out much like other
Fourth Amendment cases: the police suspected Kyllo grew marijuana
inside his home.77 Unable to procure probable cause by viewing the
home’s exterior from a public road, the police used a thermal-imaging
scanner to measure the amounts of heat within different parts of Kyllo’s
home.78 The police discovered a relatively hot area near Kyllo’s roof and
sidewall as compared to neighboring homes.79 Police secured a warrant
with the temperature information and discovered an indoor marijuanagrowth operation.80 The Supreme Court found a boundary to police
observations from publically accessible places by holding that thermalimaging scans by devices not in general public use revealing details of
70.

Id. at 210.

71.

Id. at 212.

72.

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).

73.

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 215.

76.

533 U.S. 27 (2001).

77.

Id. at 29.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 30.

80.

Id.
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the home hidden but for physical intrusion were searches which require
a warrant.81 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, clarified that the
entire area within homes “is held safe from prying government eyes”
and thus protected by the Fourth Amendment.82 But “visual observation is no ‘search’” according to Scalia.83 What Scalia seems to say
with these seemingly contradictory statements is that activities occuring within areas the human eyes could not see on their own are constitutionally protected. By adding the proviso “general public use” to
devices that can detect activities occurring within homes, Scalia left a
huge loophole open in his majority opinion future societal practices
could exploit.84 This proviso will be re-examined below in a new light,
as it can be problematic with applications like Skype and Snapchat
becoming prevalent in our society.85 For now, two other categories must
be explained.
2. The Third-Party Doctrine

The third-party doctrine is analogically similar to the assumption
of risk affirmative defense in that an individual puts himself at risk of
a calamity happening to him. A baseball fan smacked in the face by a
broken bat flying through the air is just one example of a situation in
which the assumption of risk affirmative defense would be used by a
baseball team defending itself from a tort suit. In the Fourth Amendment context, the “calamity” which could befall an individual is for
their information, freely-given under an apparent aura of confidentiality to a third party, is disclosed to the government, which then
initiates a criminal prosecution based on the information gathered. In
Smith v. Maryland,86 the Supreme Court affirmed that “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.”87 Smith’s facts are crucial, as the device used to
81.

Id. at 40.

82.

Id. at 37. Kyllo, thus, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat
output of his drug-growing lamps. Id. at 34. Admittedly, Kyllo is a tough case
to classify in my three categories of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating
to mass surveillance (those being (1) the legitimate expectation of privacy; (2)
the third-party doctrine; and (3) the property-based approach to the Fourth
Amendment), as it foreshadows Scalia’s reintroduction of the property-based
approach. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
However, I decided that Kyllo was best suited for the legitimate expectation
of privacy category because it highlights one of the few reasonable expectations
of privacy that is considered a bright-line rule. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.

83.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.

84.

See id. at 34.

85.

See infra Part V(B).

86.

442 U.S. 735 (1979).

87.

Id. at 743–44.
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gather the voluntarily-disclosed information in Smith works similarly to
the telephone metadata program in Clapper.88
Smith robbed a woman in Baltimore, but he was not identified by
her initially.89 She then received threatening and obscene phone calls
from the robber who once asked her to step outside, and at that time,
she saw a 1975 Monte Carlo pass her home.90 The police later spotted
the same car and used its license plate number to identify a suspect,
Smith.91 To confirm that he was the source of the woman’s annoying
phone calls, a telephone company installed a pen register—without a
warrant—to record the numbers dialed from Smith’s home.92 Smith
turned out to be the caller as well as the robber, and he was arrested.93
A notable fact is that Smith used his home telephone to make his calls,
yet the Supreme Court determined that his conduct failed to preserve
the privacy of the numbers he dialed because he voluntarily provided
the telephone company with the numbers needed to complete his call.94
Similar outcomes have occurred in other contexts.
Miller, a man suspected of operating an unregistered still, had
accounts with two banks in Georgia.95 Previously, a warehouse rented
to Miller caught fire, and the authorities found distillery paraphernalia
in it.96 A grand jury issued subpoenas to the presidents of the two banks
to produce all records of accounts in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller over
a span of several months.97 The presidents complied.98 Miller’s case
traveled all the way to the Supreme Court, which held that he had no
protected Fourth Amendment interest in the disclosure of the bank
records of his accounts.99 The Supreme Court determined that the
account records belonged to the banks, not to Miller, and that the
88.

Compare id. at 741 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
167 (1977)) (“These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the
telephone numbers that have been dialed.”), with ACLU v. Clapper, 785
F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]elephone metadata do not include the
voice content of telephone conversations. Rather, they include details
about telephone calls.”).

89.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id. at 743.

95.

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at 437–38.

98.

Id. at 438.

99.

Id. at 440.
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information in the records was “voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”100
Despite the fact that Miller likely assumed that the information about
his bank accounts was confidential and to be used for a limited purpose,
the Fourth Amendment was held to not prohibit the government from
obtaining the records.101 While records created from bank transactions
and dialed phone numbers are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, an even more critical issue for understanding the limits of mass
surveillance is whether the content of conversations entirely held within
a home or hotel room receive constitutional protection.
Nashville was the site of a trial in which Jimmy Hoffa was convicted
for trying to bribe members of a jury in a separate case, in which he
allegedly violated a section of the Taft-Hartley Act.102 During this
previous case, known as Test Fleet, a man named Edward Partin
accompanied Hoffa and his cohorts in a hotel suite, hotel lobby, courthouse, and other areas around Nashville.103 Partin served as a government informant as he stayed near Hoffa.104 Partin provided crucial
information about Hoffa and his associates’ desire to bribe the Test
Fleet jury members.105 Partin received access to Hoffa’s hotel suite, and
by doing so, obtained verbal evidence against Hoffa’s interest.106 Hoffa
argued that Partin’s failure to reveal his role as an informer destroyed
the permission Hoffa gave for Partin to enter Hoffa’s hotel suite and
constituted an illegal search.107 Nevertheless, Hoffa’s argument failed.
Hoffa’s legal team implicated no interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment: “[Hoffa] was not relying on the security of the hotel room;
he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not
reveal his wrongdoing.”108 The Supreme Court additionally noted that
Hoffa invited Partin into the hotel room and incriminated himself either
directly to Partin or within Partin’s presence.109 United States v.
White110 and Lopez v. United States111 came to a similar conclusion: the
100. Id. at 440, 442.
101. See id. at 443.
102. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294–95 (1966).
103. Id. at 296.
104. Id. at 299.
105. Id. at 296.
106. See id. at 302.
107. Id. at 300.
108. Id. at 302.
109. Id.
110. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
111. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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government need not procure a warrant when a government agent,
unknown to a defendant, hides electronic equipment on his person to
record the defendant’s words and then offers those words as evidence.112
The Supreme Court summarized the dangers of conversing about
criminal activities with others by stating:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he
sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very
probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.113

The sum of the third-party doctrine is this: any information
voluntarily provided to others is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection, no matter whether the information is exchanged in the
public square or within the sanctity of a home.
3. The Property-Based Approach to the Fourth Amendment

The property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment seemingly
disappeared in Katz.114 Justice Scalia held differently in Jones v. United
States.115 In Jones, police attached a GPS tracker to the undercarriage
of Jones’ Jeep while it was parked in a public lot.116 The GPS locational
data showed that Jones frequented a stash house containing cash,
cocaine, and cocaine base.117 Scalia determined that attaching the GPS
to the Jeep constituted a search per the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment at its adoption.118 Scalia made this confident assertion by
stating that a car is an “‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth]
Amendment.”119 A distinguishing factor in this case is that Jones owned
the Jeep before the government installed the GPS device on its
undercarriage.120 This is different than police officers inserting a beeper
112. White, 401 U.S. at 749; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438–440.
113. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
115. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
116. Id. at 948.
117. Id. at 948–49.
118. Id. at 949.
119. Id. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
12 (1977) (“It is true that . . . automobiles are ‘effects’ under the Fourth
Amendment, and searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore
subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness.”).
120. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (distinguishing the facts of Jones’ case from
two cases that the Government relied upon to argue that what happened
was not a search).
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(locational transmitter) into a container before defendants purchase the
containers, as that action, which monitored the public vehicular movements of the suspects, was not a search.121 With Justice Scalia resurrecting the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment in Jones,
the relevance of the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test came into
question.
Justice Scalia helped clarify the importance of the Katz analysis in
light of his majority opinion in Jones by saying, “[s]ituations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would
remain subject to Katz analysis.”122 The implication of this statement
for Fourth Amendment issues involving mass surveillance is substantial
and will be further analyzed below.123 Justice Scalia’s property-based
approach to the Fourth Amendment continued to evolve as he further
opined on the matter in 2014.
Florida v. Jardines124 determined whether a drug-sniffing dog used
on a homeowner’s porch to sniff for contents within the home constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.125 An anonymous tipster
informed police that Jardines had marijuana in his home.126 Police noted
no activity occurring around the home and decided to walk to the front
door—with a drug-sniffing dog.127 The dog indicated that it smelled
marijuana in the home, and this was enough information for a judge to
issue a warrant, leading to officers finding marijuana.128 The Supreme
Court held that because the dog revealed information which was within
a home, its action was a search under the Fourth Amendment.129 Justice
Scalia opined why the officers’ conduct was so inappropriate relative to
implicit neighborhood customs.
This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.
Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not
121. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the public
movements of a suspect on roadways was not a search under Fourth
Amendment).
122. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (emphasis removed).
123. See infra Part V(A).
124. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
125. Id. at 1413–14.
126. Id. at 1413.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1417–18 (holding that the officers and the dog were on a
Constitutionally protected area of the defendant’s home and thus there
was an intrusion).
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require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed
without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-ortreaters.130

In contrast to the practices of door-to-door cookie sellers and
Halloween candy seekers, police officers walking a dog close enough to
a home to discover incriminating evidence without a warrant offended
Justice Scalia’s view of how people conduct themselves regarding the
property of others.131 The outcome of Jardines is very similar to Kyllo
in that Justice Scalia thought that it was not a generally accepted
practice to thermally scan a person’s home to reveal activities occurring
behind the home’s front door and walls.132
Besides labeling dog sniffs occurring on a home’s front porch and
GPS devices attached to vehicles as Fourth Amendment searches, the
Supreme Court also addressed whether tracking devices attached to
people, without consent, constitute a search. Though Grady v. North
Carolina133 did not determine the constitutionality of a sex-offender
tracking program wholesale, it did declare that “[North Carolina]’s
program is plainly designed to obtain information. And since it does so
by physically intruding on a subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search.”134
With the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence refresher completed,
the necessary ingredients exist to decide whether the telephone metadata program featured in Clapper violates the Fourth Amendment.

III. Clapper’s Constitutional Claim Outcome
The telephone metadata program in Clapper is constitutional
because it falls under the third-party doctrine of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The telephone metadata program in Clapper works
similarly to the pen register technology (capable of recording telephone
numbers dialed) featured in Smith v. Maryland.135 The telephone metadata program in Clapper required Verizon to produce call records daily
of all calls made through its system where one or both ends of the call

130. Id. at 1415.
131. Id. at 1416.
132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Shades of Justice Scalia’s
“general public use” proviso seem present in Jardines. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. at 1415.
133. 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
134. Id. at 1371.
135. 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (explaining that a pen register records the
numbers a person dials on their telephone in their home).
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were within the United States.136 The ACLU may argue that the
telephone metadata program’s systemic, nationwide reach distinguishes
it from the holding in Maryland v. Smith v. Maryland. This argument
will likely fail because, while the number of people whose metadata is
collected is far greater in Clapper,137 the legal principle undergirding
both Clapper and Smith v. Maryland is the same: a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over
to third parties.138
The ACLU could also argue that the telephone metadata program
in Clapper differs from Smith v. Maryland because the telephone metadata program did not require physically installing pen registers for all
Verizon account holders. This argument falls flat. There was no
physical system needed to produce bank account records in United
States v. Miller,139 but that did not stop the Supreme Court from ruling
that bank account records were disclosable without a warrant.140 Smith
and Miller speak to the proposition that when individuals perform
activities that generate data points or willingly provide content to third
parties, those third parties may then disclose that information to the
government, and the government need not seek a warrant when
obtaining records from a third-party source.
The legal conclusion in this section is surely disturbing to many
individuals. However, it is the correct conclusion, as it follows the thirdparty doctrine. Not surprisingly, some have called for the revision of
the third-party doctrine as a means of reducing the danger of dragnetstyle government mass surveillance. These calls have come even from
the Supreme Court.

IV. Calls for Reform
Many different sources have called for reform of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. This section will feature three of those
sources: (A) Justices of the Supreme Court; (B) legal academics; and
(C) my proposed jurisprudential reform, which will protect individuals
from some forms of government mass surveillance by preventing the
government from accessing the content of individuals’ conversations
directly, at least without seeking the consent of one of the parties who
participated in the conversation. I call this the derivative-consent
doctrine; just because parties consent to converse with each other does
not allow the government to listen in to (or watch, if referring to a

136. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 795–96 (2d Cir. 2015).
137. See id. at 796.
138. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
139. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
140. Id. at 442.

279

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows

videophone conversation through an application such as Skype) the
conversation as if a party also consented to that.
A. Calls for Reform from the Supreme Court

Some Justices of the Supreme Court have pondered the need for
jurisprudential reform due to the increasingly electronic and nonphysical nature of surveillance techniques. Justice Sotomayor noted
that “the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring
undertaken in this case [Jones] by enlisting factory- or owner-installed
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”141 She further
stated that the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment is
not as useful when dealing with electronic surveillance not dependent
on physical encroachments on property.142 After discrediting Justice
Scalia’s approach in Jones, Justice Sotomayor reviewed the dangers of
the third-party doctrine, as in today’s digital age people reveal large
quantities of information to third-parties.143
The amount of information third parties receive about our goingson is dramatic. Justice Sotomayor further wrote that people “disclose
the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the
URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries,
and medications they purchase to online retailers.”144 But despite individuals’ willingness to conduct their lives in a manner which third
parties may observe, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that people
likely “would [not] accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure
to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the
last week, or month, or year.”145 One solution the Supreme Court may
implement in the future is to assert that individuals have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information they exchange to third parties
in the course of conducting their daily internet surfing, calls or texts, email addresses, and online purchase orders.146
Justice Alito also wrote a concurrence in Jones. His solutions to the
difficult Fourth Amendment problems created by electronic means of
141. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 954–57.
144. Id. at 957.
145. Id.
146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(detailing the traditional legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test regarding
third parties). Justice Scalia acknowledged that Katz would apply to “the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
953. As society evolves, so will our privacy expectations. Id. at 955
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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surveillance are not through case law but through the political
branches.147 Justice Alito highlighted wiretapping as an example of a
difficult Fourth Amendment issue that was reformed through legislation
instead of case law.148 Justice Alito explained why he believes the proper
solution to electronic surveillance reform is found in Congress, stating
that a “legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public
safety in a comprehensive way.”149
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggests the need for a jurisprudential reform to change the third-party doctrine, seemingly based
on Katz’s legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test, which is designed to
measure society’s perception of when Fourth Amendment protection
exists.150 Justice Alito’s concurrence supports a legislative reform to the
electronic surveillance issue. The best solution may require a bit of both.
B. Academic Perspectives
1. Hosein and Palow Article

A symposium article by Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow
addresses some of the Fourth Amendment issues created by the many
technological marvels that we take for granted.151 The pervasiveness of
modern communications technology in our society is well-known. Those
who choose not to use such technology “would be socially and economyically” excluded.152 Technologies requiring remote access are well suited
for the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to be applied to
them.153 The cameras and microphones incorporated in many devices
we carry present the danger for incredible intrusions into our conversations, even potentially providing unwanted glances into our homes.
Hosein and Palow discuss how cameras and microphones in computers
“under the control of an offensive technology, could record . . .
information about the computer’s surroundings, from private conversations to pictures and video of the objects and persons who happen to
be in front of the camera.”154 After outlining the danger that

147. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 964.
150. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
151. Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance
Techniques, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 1071 (2013).
152. Id. at 1077.
153. Id. at 1093.
154. Id. at 1094.
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microphone- and camera-equipped technology presents, Hosein and
Palow offer a solution:
If, while the computer resides in such a protective place, the
government could not gain access to it without a warrant, then
the government should not be able to install an offensive technology on that device merely because, for some fractional amount
of time, it may be located outside of the protected sphere.155

Working off Hosein and Palow’s proposed jurisprudential solution,
consider this possibility. A law student, eyes glazing over from
completing her law school writing requirement on her computer in her
apartment, decides to walk down the street to get a much-needed
caffeinated beverage at her favorite coffee shop. It contains a publically
accessible internet network, and she figures she can continue writing
her paper while sipping her drink. Unbeknownst to her, a fellow law
student discovered that she had a strong interest in illegal horticulture
and disclosed this information to the government. An agent, waiting
for her to leave the protected area of her apartment, followed her to the
coffee shop, where he used the publically accessible internet network to
secretly upload malware to her computer.
When the law student returns to her apartment, she places her
computer in the same room as her special “plants” with the computer’s
camera facing the plants. After she retires for a well-deserved rest, the
malware within her computer activates, serendipitously using her
computer’s camera to record images of the marijuana growing in her
room. The images provide sufficient probable cause for a judge to grant
a warrant, and she is arrested for her illegal marijuana growing. The
danger Hosein and Palow warn of is the ability of a webcam to show
the government images that it would not be able to, absent physical
invasion of a person’s abode. Their article states that warrants must be
issued for the type of situation encountered by our illegally-gardening
law student.156
Another issue involves the information that can be gathered from
cell phones. International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers
impersonate mobile base stations, allowing mobile phones to be located
and identified within range of the device.157 Although IMSI catchers can
intercept content transmitted by mobile phones, Hosein and Palow
155. Id. at 1095–96 (citation omitted).
156. See id. at 1096 (“[A] person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of her computer, and in its ability to transmit audio, video, or
locational information regarding her surroundings when those surroundings
are likely to constitute traditionally protected areas such as the home and
the office.”).
157. Id. at 1097.
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state that the content is protected by the Wiretap Act, forcing police
to obtain a warrant prior to examining the content of communications.158 Another restriction on tracking individuals’ whereabouts
through cell phones is if they enter their homes. The Supreme Court,
in United States v. Karo,159 did not allow a tracking device (or beeper)
implanted in a drum of drug-making ingredients to show the precise
location—within Karo’s home—where the drum sat without a warrant.160 Similarly, if an IMSI catcher indicated a cell phone’s location
within a person’s home, that information would not be collectible unless
the police obtained a warrant.161 Hosein and Palow’s analysis shows that
it is possible that courts will restrict the ability of the government to
track a person’s whereabouts at all times through IMSI catchers, while
also arguing that the government could not install malware on a
computer in a public place, and then activate the malware as it sits in
a constitutionally-protected location, such as a person’s abode.
2. Harvard Law Review’s Proposed Jurisprudential
Solution for Mass Surveillance

The Harvard Law Review shares the concerns that many others in
our society have concerning mass surveillance. The esteemed scholarly
publication especially worries that “when the focus of surveillance turns
from monitoring a specific place to monitoring a specific person, the
potential for uncovering the intimate details of that person’s life is
substantially higher.”162 As a solution to preventing the government
from gathering too much intimate information on an individual,
Harvard Law Review proposes a two-factor test to determine whether
enhanced observation is a search: (1) the intensity of the surveillance
and (2) the state’s ability to synthesize the information collected to
produce a particularized profile of an individual.163
The reasoning behind this test is “to mirror the practical barriers
that once constrained police conduct.”164 Additionally, the test counters
the third-party doctrine because “economic considerations no longer

158. Id.
159. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
160. Id. at 716.
161. Hosein & Palow, supra note 151, at 1098–99.
162. Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Holds That GPS Tracking Is Not a Search
– United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), reh’g and
suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, No. 06-2741, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
8397 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2007), 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2230, 2235 (2007).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2236.

283

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows

stand as a barrier to widespread, intrusive observation.”165 While the
rule proposed by the Harvard Law Review is normative, it at least
recognizes the widespread danger caused by mass surveillance. But it is
too difficult to measure. What one judge may consider to be soft surveillance may to another be overly intrusive. There is a better solution.
3. How Electronic Information is Captured
and a Property-Based Solution

There are other surveillance programs in operation besides the
telephone metadata program highlighted in Clapper. One example is
PRISM, a program that collects the contents of communications and
other assorted information through internet-based service providers
such as Google, Apple, and Facebook.166 The NSA, using PRISM, can
access “email, chat, photos, stored data, voice over IP, and other
information stored on participating companies’ servers.”167 Another
surveillance method is called upstream collection, which means that the
government collected communications passing through a telecommunication provider before they reached their destination.168
If PRISM and upstream collection were not enough, another option
is XKeyscore, which allows analysts to search metadata, the content of
e-mails, and internet browser history, without even knowing the e-mail
address of the person targeted by the search.169 Other information discoverable with XKeyscore includes social media activity and browsing
data.170 With an array of surveillance programs at the government’s
disposal, there may be little hope of keeping any electronic communications truly private.
Under Smith v. Maryland,171 it may be argued that any communications or data passed through an internet service provider does not
constitute a search.172 One way to preclude this outcome is to pass
legislation vesting property rights in electronic communications and

165. Id. at 2237.
166. Megan Blass, Note, The New Data Marketplace: Protecting Personal
Data, Electronic Communications, and Individual Privacy in the Age of
Mass Surveillance Through a Return to a Property-Based Approach to
the Fourth Amendment, 42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 577, 579–80 (2015).
167. Id. at 580.
168. Id. The NSA established a room at AT&T’s Folsom Street Facility in San
Francisco to collect all communications passing through. Id.
169. Id. at 581.
170. Id.
171. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
172. Blass, supra note 166, at 586.

284

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows

personal information.173 Doing so would apply Justice Scalia’s propertybased approach to the Fourth Amendment as exhibited in Jones.174
Bypassing a firewall or password protection to access content would be
construed as a Fourth Amendment search if electronic comm-unications
were considered property, as is stated in this proposal.175 But this proposal could be problematic as well because it could chill work-place
communications by scaring people from sending e-mails to sources that
the original writer did not explicitly consent could receive such
information.
C. Author’s Proposal: Derivative-Consent Doctrine

I agree that reform is needed in the Fourth Amendment’s jurisprudence to protect individuals from mass surveillance capabilities. But
the trick is in balancing the need to protect civil liberties with the need
to secure the United States from threats, particularly those originating
from overseas. I disagree with the notion that the third-party doctrine
must be eliminated. Information voluntarily disclosed to others should
be, in most cases, available for anyone to view, including the government, without consequence.176 There are, however, some situations in
which individuals did not turn over or create information voluntarily,
but the government then decides to peruse the communi-cation anyway.
The derivative-consent doctrine is designed to prevent the government from accessing the content of conversations, as well as controlling
or using devices, without another individual first revealing the information or operating a device. The derivative-consent doctrine is best
thought of as an alternative approach to the Katz legitimateexpectation-of-privacy test177 and is not designed to eviscerate current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. What the derivative-consent doctrine is designed to do is prevent Orwellian-style mass surveillance from
becoming a fixture in the United States.

173. Id.
174. Id.; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
175. Blass, supra note 166, at 594.
176. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. Note that the Smith opinion emphasizes the
word “voluntarily” when referring to information given to third parties. Id.
177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
While I value the Katz legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test for its
ability to assert Fourth Amendment rights based on how society changes,
the test appears too vulnerable to differing outcomes based on political
philosophy and ideological alliances. I believe a consent-based test is not
as vulnerable to the changes in the ideological composition of the Supreme
Court and general populace, and desire it to provide a baseline of
protection against Orwellian mass surveillance no matter what part of the
political spectrum controls surveillance efforts at a certain time.
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Explaining the derivative-consent doctrine is best done through
examples, though I will attempt to state it as a legal rule. Consent in
the context of surveillance is best thought of as two levels. Level one is
an individual’s voluntary assertion of consent. For instance, when a
person dials a number or sends a text message that person voluntarily
consents to the cell-phone provider recording the numbers, the length
of the text or call, and other information pertinent for billing purposes.
Surveillance performed at level one, in which individuals create metadata through their need to exchange information with a service provider
in order for a device to perform a specified task, is constitutional under
Smith and the third-party doctrine.178
Level two is where Orwellian surveillance efforts go to die. Level
two surveillance occurs when a provider discloses the contents of
electronic messages to the government and when a device owned by an
individual is hijacked by others (most likely through malicious
software), allowing it to reveal information that otherwise would not
have been seen or heard. Level two surveillance is explicitly outside of
the third-party doctrine because information gathered through it is not
voluntarily provided by the person the government is investigating.179
Gathering information using means beyond a person’s voluntary acts,
therefore, requires a warrant for such an act constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment.

V. Derivative-Consent Doctrine in Action
Because the derivative-consent doctrine is more difficult to understand when stated abstractly, I will use several examples to show the
application of the doctrine. Not all of these examples will resolve
themselves using the derivative-consent doctrine. Some examples demonstrate that the derivative-consent doctrine is not meant to displace
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, the first
example comes straight out of Jones.
A. The Phantom Activation of a Stolen Vehicle Detection System

Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones proposed a hypothetical which,
he insinuated, may conflict with Justice Scalia’s property-based
approach to the Fourth Amendment. For purposes of this example,
equate a vehicle’s built-in GPS navigation system with a stolen vehicle
178. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
179. Id. “This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.” Id. (emphasis added). But note that the third-party doctrine does not
require warrants to track the public movements of individuals. Id. See United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the public movements of
a suspect on roadways was not a search under Fourth Amendment).
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detection system. Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Jones, wrote
“suppose that the officers in the present case [Jones] had followed
respondent by surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection
system that came with the car when it was purchased. Would sending
of a radio signal to activate this system constitute a trespass to
chattels?”180 Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, also mentioned in
dicta that this type of situation may not be a trespass, since the system
was activated with a signal.181 While it is difficult to tell how Justice
Scalia would answer this question, this is an example of a scenario
answerable by either the derivative-consent doctrine or by Justice
Scalia’s property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment.
The derivative-consent analysis works like this. When the car was
on the dealer’s lot, it belonged to the dealer.182 At this time, the dealer
could consent to the government activating the stolen-vehicle detector
within the car, should it be stolen while the dealer controls the car.
Once the dealer sells the car, the ability to use its stolen vehicle detector
lies with the new owner. Suppose the owner’s spouse takes the car for
a spin without telling the owner, and the owner assumes it stolen. The
owner then activates the car’s stolen vehicle system, and finds that the
car is at the local supermarket (the spouse took it on a grocery run).
Information created by the voluntary use of the system by the car’s
owner may be turned over to the government without a warrant. This
is level one surveillance.
To upgrade the surveillance at issue to level two, suppose that, as
in Jones, police track the movements of a suspect. However, instead of
attaching a physical GPS unit to the vehicle’s undercarriage,183 officers
instead tracked the device by remotely activating the system, as Justice
Alito’s hypothetical states.184 This is level two surveillance, and thus
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, because the system
was not active due to the voluntary consent of its owner.
Alternatively, Justice Alito’s hypothetical can be answered using
Justice Scalia’s property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment.
Once the car (and thus the components within the car, including the
stolen vehicle detection system) is purchased, it is the owner’s property.
If the stolen vehicle detection system is remotely activated by someone
other than the owner, this would also be a search that requires a
180. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
181. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”) (emphasis removed).
182. Whether the car belonged to the dealer or to the car company that made
it is irrelevant to the analysis because the outcome is the same.
183. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
184. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
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warrant, because the car (including its inner components) is an “effect”
under the Fourth Amendment.185 Hijacking someone else’s property for
your own use, without a warrant, should be impermissible under the
Fourth Amendment.
B. The Skype Friend Becomes an Enemy

Skype provides a whole new world of communication possibilities.
It is the darling of couples in long-distance relationships who seek more
than to hear the voice of their loving companion, as it uses cameras
incorporated within computers to show a person’s face on the other end
of the call. Besides showing the person on the other end of the call, the
image on your computer is likely to show what is immediately behind
the person too. Besides warming the hearts of long-distance lovers,
Skype video calls create interesting Fourth Amendment issues.
Assume that a Skype caller observes a suspicious-looking plant
behind the person on the other end of the call. The background image
of the call indicates that the person on the other end of the call is within
his home. After completing the call, the law-and-order minded friend
calls police and reports that her friend has marijuana in his bedroom,
located at address X. Police rely on the information voluntarily provided to them by seeking and receiving a search warrant. Police then
successfully discover marijuana at the address and arrest the boy who
was on the other end of the call.
Unlike the previous example, the derivative-consent doctrine does
not apply. The answer to this Fourth Amendment issue is an easy one:
because the boy trusted that the girl he called would not give away the
fact that he had a marijuana plant in his bedroom, the information she
provided receives no Fourth Amendment protection, as it is subject to
the third-party doctrine.186
C. E-mail and Social-Media Messages

The next example depicts whether the content of e-mail and socialmedia messages may be disclosed to the government without a warrant.
Before jumping into the analysis, a proviso is required. A social-media
message’s contents are defined as only intended for individuals designated as receivers; they are not pronouncements for the whole world to
know about. E-mails and social-media messages may appear to be subject to the third-party doctrine because they are processed through an
internet-service provider.187 However, the derivative-consent doctrine
provides a different outcome.
185. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
186. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
187. See Blass, supra note 166, at 586 (“Smith made it such that surveillance
and investigation involving collection or review of communications or data
that have passed through an internet service provider, a precondition
satisfied anytime the internet is involved, do not constitute searches.”).

288

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows

A person sends an e-mail from his apartment, which has a private
connection to the internet. The e-mail contains metadata, most notably
the e-mail addresses of the sender and the receiver. The metadata may
be disclosed by the internet-service provider because it is only level one
surveillance. The sender consents to the internet-service provider using
the e-mail addresses provided to send the message. This is obvious
because the sender would not send the message if he did not consent to
allowing the service provider to use the most basic information required
in transmitting the message. Now suppose that the provider, instead of
merely transmitting the message, decides to disclose its content to the
government. This is level two surveillance, and constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment. Unless the sender consents that the
provider also show the government the contents of the message, such a
disclosure requires a warrant.
Even without arguing that e-mails should be considered personal
property,188 other constitutional jurisprudence dictates Fourth
Amendment protection for messages or packages sent through mailing
services.189 Letters and other sealed packages are “effects” under the
Fourth Amendment, meaning “warrantless searches of . . . effects are
presumptively unreasonable.”190 United States v. Jacobsen191 featured a
damaged package that was opened by a third-party carrier.192 The
carrier and DEA agents determined that the package contained
cocaine.193 The Supreme Court held that the package did have Fourth
Amendment protection, but lost such protection because a third-party
opened the package, albeit because it was accidentally damaged by a
forklift.194
When individuals send letters, they expect those letters to remain
private.195 It is illogical to conclude that messages sent through e-mail
or through a social-media message would receive different treatment
than that of physical letters and packages sent through mailing services.
Moreover, e-mails, messages, and attached files are not damageable in
“shipping” the same way that physical letters and packages are, so

188. Id. at 586. If emails are designated as personal property, they would likely be
considered an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
189. I define “mailing services” as the Postal Service, UPS, FedEx, W.B. Mason,
and other similar parcel shipping and delivery services.
190. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
191. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
192. Id. at 111.
193. Id. at 111–12
194. Id. at 111, 115.
195. Id. at 115.

289

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows

internet-service providers will not have the excuse that they opened the
e-mail in order to transfer it to an unbroken container.
The Katz analysis on its own may provide protection by analogizing
physical letters and packages to e-mails, messages, and attachments.196
But the derivative-consent doctrine provides protection that is not
based on society’s perception of what privacy is,197 so it would be best
to hold that under it, e-mails and social-media messages are not
disclosable to the government without a warrant, unless the sender or
the receiver consents that the internet-service provider also send the
message to the government.
While the derivative-consent doctrine reduces the voluntary power
of third-party internet-service providers serving as information transmitters to disclose information to the government, it more import-antly
prevents Orwellian-style surveillance of the contents of electronic
communications. No nation with an amendment protecting against
“unreasonable searches and seizures” shall force its citizens into a shell
of secrecy.198 Doing so will harm our ability to conduct business, make
friends, seek our soul mates, and conduct our lives without feeling like
a shadow of surveillance falls over our every communication.

Conclusion
This Comment began by comprehensively reviewing the facts of
ACLU v. Clapper. It then reviewed the text of the Fourth Amendment,
as well as the Supreme Court’s remedy for violations of the Fourth
Amendment, the exclusionary rule. What followed was an outline of
three categories of Fourth Amendment cases: (1) cases concerning the
legitimate expectation of privacy; (2) the third-party doctrine; and (3)
the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. After
determining that the outcome of the Fourth Amendment claim in
Clapper would have been an assertion of the third-party doctrine as a
justification for Verizon’s telephone metadata program, the Comment
considered several solutions.
Justice Sotomayor proposed that the third-party doctrine be
revised because the metadata produced by mundane daily tasks is so
great that individuals’ intimate associations may be revealed. She also
argued that American citizens likely would have an expectation of
privacy in the data their electronic interactions create. Justice Alito
argued that a better solution for restricting mass surveillance would be
to enact legislation restricting practices, such as the remotely activating
theft-detection systems in vehicles, which could conceivably be used to
track a person’s movements at all times.
196. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
197. Id.
198. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

290

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows

Besides the Supreme Court, a few solutions to the metadata issue
were highlighted from other academic sources. Making sure that
malware uploaded surreptitiously to individuals’ computers in public
networks could not be used to turn on a computers’ microphone and
camera was the focus of one source, as was the ability of ICMI catchers
to constitutionally detect individuals’ public movements. Another
source, such as the Harvard Law Review, created a two-factor test for
surveillance, but I found the test easy to manipulate based on whether
a judge has a civil libertarian or a law and order bent. Still one other
source advocated that Congress should vest property rights in electronic
communications. None of these sources provided a comprehensive
solution.
I proposed what should provide an adequate balance between civil
liberties and security. My derivative-consent doctrine divides surveillance into two levels. Level one surveillance involves information created
by an individual’s voluntary assertion. This includes metadata, the
information that individuals consent to provide to telecommun-ications
companies or mail carriers in order to send messages to the intended
recipients. Level one surveillance is constitutional under the third-party
doctrine and does not require a warrant to procure.
Level two surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. The contents of e-mails, social-media messages, as well as
any information gathered about a person that he did not volunteer to
provide is included in level two surveillance. Despite the derivativeconsent doctrine’s invention, it does not displace existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. What the derivative-consent doctrine does
do is provide a supplementary method for thinking through mass
surveillance issues that prevents the government from ever asserting an
Orwellian-style surveillance system over the United States.
An example of the overlap between the derivative-consent doctrine
and current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would be internetservice providers’ inability to provide the government with the contents
of a message sent through e-mail without the sender’s consent, since
the internet-service provider acts as a transmitter of information, not
as a receiver of it. The third-party doctrine does allow a receiver of an
e-mail to disclose the contents of the e-mail to the government.
Constitutionally speaking, the result of Clapper should be the same
regardless of whether current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or the
derivative-consent doctrine is used to sense its outcome. It is not a
Fourth Amendment violation for telephone companies to disseminate
metadata under the third-party doctrine. Telephone companies may
also disseminate metadata under my derivative-consent doctrine
because metadata is only level one surveillance, meaning that metadata
is information that an individual consents to provide in order that the
telephone company is able to complete the call.
The technological devices surrounding us are like windows into our
lives. With proper use, they can be of great benefit to our economy,
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social lives, and productivity. When these devices are misused by forces
and individuals beyond our control, they can open windows into our
lives, revealing intimate details in a manner not much different from
the pervasive surveillance scheme found in George Orwell’s classic
dystopian novel 1984.199 The derivative-consent doctrine can close many
of these open windows.
Of course, any time an individual interacts with another person, a
company, or other third-party, whether in person or electronically, some
information must be provided to facilitate the connection. These are
windows into our lives that we can control, just like a person can open
or close blinds. But when another entity tries to open the windows into
your life without your permission,200 the Fourth Amendment exists to
quash these attempts and create balance. While a person hunched over
their computer in a dark room with the blinds drawn and door locked
may feel confident that the trail of websites he visits is known only to
him, he is in for a rude awakening. But what confidence remains within
him shall be placed in the individuals he communicates with. While the
art of secret-keeping may not be highly valued in a society supercharged
by the need for gossip, it is an art worth remembering for those you
care about the most. The derivative-consent doctrine provides the
needed Fourth Amendment protection that the content of our communication deserves. Finding the few friends trustworthy enough to
guard our deepest and darkest secrets then becomes a higher priority
than crouching in the shadows, hoping to devise a way to communicate
remotely in a manner undetectable by our own government.
Alex Brown†

199. George Orwell, 1984 (1949).
200. Not including situations when one’s presence in public allows others to
physically follow or use devices to track your public position.
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